Philosophical inquiry in the UK has taken a somewhat different route from that in the US and various parts of Europe. Practitioners in the UK tend to use a great deal of home-grown materials instead of the IAPC books. They also rely on a range of philosophical stimuli that are not, or not exclusively, based on text. Their embeddedness in the North-American educational, cultural and linguistic contexts renders the IAPC texts sometimes opaque, even perplexing, to British child readers. This paper explores possibilities of initiating ‘aesthetic’ inquiry, i.e. philosophical inquiry with works of art and craft and other objects, e.g. religious artefacts and everyday, found or natural objects. It investigates the differences between aesthetic and conventional text based inquiries and makes suggestions about the advantages and value of aesthetic inquiry. That stimuli other than purpose-written philosophical texts are admissible as starting points for philosophical inquiry does not automatically mean that they work the same way as texts. In conventional enquiry the (purpose-written philosophical) text is the springboard for enquiry: a vehicle, and no more than that, to convey the participants to the realm of philosophical inquiry. The text has not, or is not meant to have, intrinsic aesthetic qualities. However, a picture, a piece of music or a craft object does have a different kind of physical reality from text, as well as inescapable aesthetic qualities. These qualities necessitate an approach to the inquiry that is different from the text-based one. Whilst the literature on aesthetic inquiries has been increasing, albeit slowly, their special characteristics do not yet seem to have been subjected to systematic investigation. Since it is my contention that there are important differences between text- and non-text-based inquiries both in terms of their nature and the nature of the inquiry they generate, I hope that this paper will contribute to a discussion on these differences.

O presente artigo é uma análise da recepção inicial e posterior adaptação do programa Filosofia para Crianças de Matthew Lipman na América Latina (AL). São tomadas como ponto de partida as suas principais características filosóficas pragmatistas e em seguida mostra-se o modo como o seu trabalho e o seu pensamento influenciaram a AL. Por fim, faz-se um esforço para elaborar possíveis relações futuras entre as idéias de Lipman e o contexto latino-americano. Para aqueles que já estão familiarizados com o trabalho de Lipman, o caminho pragmatista que ele seguiu parece ser facilmente reconhecido. Lipman adapta o conceito de “comunidade de investigação” de Peirce na elaboração de sua abordagem de Filosofia para Crianças; frequentemente, ele se refere ao eixo conceitual da filosofia de John Dewey; e também, recorre ao conceito de “ciência normal” de Thomas S. Kuhn. Com a proposta filosófica de Lipman percebemos a relação estreita entre a filosofia e a educação, o que implica na consideração necessária da abordagem epistemológica, ética e política decorrente. Assim, transportando-se estas idéias para o contexto latino-americano podemos constatar as implicações do programa lipmaniano no tocante à tolerância e ao respeito necessários num mundo marcadamente diverso e plural, desejoso por uma democracia real e verdadeira. De acordo com esta perspectiva, tendemos a um futuro onde todos poderão participar efetivamente das decisões para a melhoria da sociedade, uma vez que serão todos capazes de pensar de modo razoável e justo, hábeis no manejo de idéias e de argumentos, auto-confiantes e disciplinados individual e socialmente, sabendo pensar bem e julgar com responsabilidade intelectual e moral. No caso latino-americano, torna-se necessário o entendimento crítico sobre as experiências que afetam a realidade dessas sociedades Nessa tensão do universal latino-americano versus o particular de cada uma das suas sociedades individuais, manifesta-se a contradição que mostra a riqueza dos problemas que poderão promover o maravilhamento de que nos fala Lipman e, conseqüentemente, as questões filosóficas mais pertinentes.

Faire de la philosophie à l’école pose deux problèmes majeurs : en premier lieu, celui de déterminer les conditions didactiques d’après lesquelles des enfants (mais peut-être aussi des adultes débutants) peuvent apprendre l’exercice de la pensée critique ; en second, celui de déterminer à quelles conditions ce travail peut être légitimement appelé « philosophique ». Cette étude propose une petite contribution à la résolution du premier. Nous avons choisi de présenter une situation de démarrage dans une école ordinaire, pour tenter de faire apparaître quelques éléments du problème dans des circonstances accessibles à tous. Nous adoptons une démarche que nous nommons « clinique exploratoire », qui repose sur ce qui se manifeste et ne présuppose rien des résultats éventuels. Nous faisons une analyse rigoureuse de la transcription de la séance qui constitue le matériau de l’étude. L’évènement déclencheur est la lecture d’un album1 , qui entre en résonance avec une préoccupation existentielle récurrente des enfants : les angoisses. La psychopathologie distingue traditionnellement : la peur, sensation d’un danger imminent qui se rapporte à une cause identifiée, perceptible et réelle, l’anxiété, affect pénible qui se rapporte à la possibilité d’une cause incertaine, l’angoisse, sensation de détresse qui s’accompagne de phénomènes somatiques. On peut faire une séparation entre la peur d’un côté, qui signale un réel danger, et procède des réflexes de conservation (la peur de traverser la route par grande circulation, la peur d’un chien menaçant etc.), et l’anxiété et l’angoisse de l’autre : ces deux états procèdent de pathologies diverses. La première est aisée à vaincre : il suffit la prudence, ou le courage. Les autres sont plus difficiles à dépasser : comment en effet lutter contre ce qui n’existe pas, ou qui pourrait seulement exister dans l’avenir (qui n’existe pas encore, et n’existera peut-être jamais) ?

In diesem Artikel werde ich zeigen, wie „Theorien über das Kind“ die Fremdheit und Neuheit kindlichen Denkens und Handelns missachten und dadurch den Raum der Zukunft, der uns nicht gehört, usurpieren. In Anschluss an die Theorie des Neuanfangs bei H. Arendt und der Diachronie der Zeit bei E.Lévinas werde ich darlegen, dass die subjektive Zeit kein kontinuierliches Fortlaufen derGeschichte ist. Zwar werden Kinder immer schon in eine bestehende Welt geboren, welche sieaufnehmen und durch ihr Leben weiterführen. Doch ihre Geburt ist immer auch die Chance füreinen Neuanfang. Die Freiheit des Kindes bricht mit der Kausalität der Geschichte. Jedes Kind ist der Aufbruch in eine unschuldige Welt. Im Anschluss an die Gedanken von G. Matthews werde ich zeigen, wie er durch das philosophische Gespräch mit Kindern in einen echten Dialog ihrer Neuheit und Fremdheit gelangt. Auf solche Weise eröffnet das Philosophieren mit Kindern einen dialogischen Raum, in dem zwischen Kindheit und Tradition Sinn neu entsteht.

A l’occasion de son 30e anniversaire, il est permis d’interroger la discussion philosophique avec les enfants, à la fois dans ses fondements théoriques et dans ses implications pratiques. En acceptant de reconnaître que les objectifs qu’elle s’est assignée constituent davantage un horizon à viser qu’un sommet à atteindre, il est alors permis de s’interroger : Qu’est-ce qui constitue à la fois un paradoxe et un défi de ce projet à la fois pédagogique, politique et humaniste ? Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en lumière en quoi non seulement ce paradoxe n’existe qu’en apparence, mais surtout en quoi il peut être envisagé comme un défi. De cette manière il sera possible de comprendre pourquoi cet apparent paradoxe constitue un formidable carburant du défi que constitue la défense et la promotion de la démarche de discussion philosophique avec les enfants. Nous nous proposons de montrer en trois étapes en quoi cet apparent paradoxe est en fait un défi, et la façon dont tous deux font partie de la matrice même de la philosophie pour enfants, depuis son apparition mais plus encore dans le contexte contemporain. La première partie visera à mettre en lumière une définition préliminaire de ce paradoxe. De la sorte, il sera possible d’identifier sa morphologie globale, ses enjeux épistémologiques et les présupposés herméneutiques sur lesquels il repose. En deuxième lieu, il s’agira d’explorer plus avant l’un des deux fondements de ce paradoxe : celui qui a trait à l’analyse de l’urgence à développer la discussion philosophique avec les enfants. Cette analyse aura pour finalité non seulement de souligner la nature à la fois subversive et responsable de la démarche, mais également de mettre en évidence en quoi sa légitimité est dans le même temps le moteur de son expansion. Enfin, une troisième partie veillera à étudier la manière dont ce « défi paradoxal »de la discussion philosophique avec les enfants constitue en fait un horizon individuel et collectif remarquablement fertile, en termes de développement durable de l’environnement qui est le nôtre.

Nuestra constitución del sentido de la infancia se tensa entre la voracidad con que el mercado reclama consumidores y mano de obra calificada y nuestras buenas intenciones de un futuro mejor. Preguntar por la infancia se constituye en un paso ineludible para acceder a la comprensión del lugar que otorgamos a los niños en nuestra sociedad, en nuestra cultura y en nuestras prácticas educativas. Este trabajo forma parte de una investigación más amplia sobre los fundamentos, los supuestos y las estrategias del “Programa de Filosofía para Niños” y su conexión con el pragmatismo. En esta oportunidad abordaremos la pregunta por la infancia como supuesto del “Programa de Matthew Lipman”, ya que toda práctica educativa, y en este caso la de hacer filosofía para niños, implica una construcción del significado que sostiene al proyecto. Para Lipman la concepción de la niñez aparece ligada directamente a la educación, pues su problema radica en justificar un programa de filosofía en la escuela desde el jardín de infantes hasta la finalización de la preparatoria o el polimodal en nuestro caso. La idea de niñez tomada de Dewey destaca dos puntos fundamentales, por una parte el niño encierra en sí una promesa de creatividad, el niño es potencialmente lo que proyectemos de él, es pura posibilidad, todo depende de nuestra acción y por otro lado una referencia de la parte al todo, ya que es necesario comprender la totalidad de la civilización para comprender el significado de la niñez, el niño es parte de la totalidad, si entendemos el todo, entendemos la parte. La niñez como la etapa más propicia en la formación de hábitos y costumbres, la niñez como promesa, posibilidad y parte de la civilización y la niñez con disposiciones naturales al asombro y al pensar son los puntos que posibilitan el encuentro con la filosofía.

Events in teaching often bubble up and demand attention because they stay with us long after the moment has passed, causing us to revisit and recreate them, perhaps to ask ourselves whether we might have responded differently. Deeper reflection and wider social enquiry become possible when incidents are recorded over time. Themes are identified and form the basis of theorizing and alternative action. Themes tend to emerge from awareness of our emotional responses to events and through an investigation of the values and beliefs that have informed our reactions to them. Since I am aiming to encourage and strengthen children’s participation in the community of enquiry, a major theme in my own practice is locating barriers to my listening, obstacles that inhibit children’s involvement in philosophical dialogue, whose advocates have emphasized its democratic nature and transformative educational potential. This paper describes an experience of teaching which led me to explore taboos surrounding certain topics in primary schools. In the case reported, I suggest that the subject of ‘secrets’ alludes to wider insecurities in the social construction of intimacy in child and adult relations. These difficulties inhibit the educational process and obscure the voice of the child, even in the context of philosophical dialogue, which aims to increase children’s participation. I consider the moral panic in the UK about the safety of children and the effect on interactions in the ambiguous context of primary schools. I examine the exercise of professional judgement in respect of boundaries of private and public. Conscious of a missed opportunity, I explore secrecy, hiding, concealing and revealing and the part that these play in relationships and in the making of individual identity and the sense of self. Throughout the enquiry I seek to identify obstacles to listening that limit the potential for mutual education.

"Notes toward a metaphysic of wonder" is the outcome of a "Reciprocal Inquiry" in which Leoni Henning and I participated. In our correspondence, we moved very fast: I thought each of us surprised the other. As a result, I found myself writing about astonishment more elaborately than I'd intended to. Before long I was involved not only with wondering but with awe and bewilderment and amazement, and eager to connect it all with philosophy in Latin America. So these "Notes..." are just a foretaste of what I hope will someday be a more extensive article, but which is only hinted at in the present version. Leoni Maria Padillha Henning’s thoughtful and informative paper, “Pragmatism in Matthew Lipman and its influence in Latin America” is singularly helpful in showing the relevance of Philosophy for Children to Latin-American education. Indeed, the intellectual momentum it generates is a powerful invitation to other educators and scholars to take up the issues where she leaves off. I’d like to take up just one of these issues, one that, on the surface at least, seems to be particularly unpromising. I’m referring to the near-unanimity that exists among scholars with regard to the tradition, descended from Aristotle, that philosophy begins in wonder. My intention is not to attempt to refute this claim, but to show its complicity in defending the traditional non-reflective paradigm of education, which has sturdily resisted the introduction of philosophy into the schools, just as it resists the conversion of the classroom into a community of inquiry. With the proper pedagogy, philosophy can readily be taught to children, and the teaching of philosophy for children can readily be taught to teachers. It is not essential that wonder precede philosophy: it can just as well follow it.

Philosophy for Children is in vogue--in Germany, in Europe, in nearly the whole world. Closer consideration reveals that Philosophy for Children is not always used as a clear and distinct didactical-methodological term. Sometimes it seems like a fashion word, used frequently but never quite clearly. In spite of its long history, a scientific foundation is missing. The risks that might result from these circumstances could be, not just wastefulness, but the destruction of a pioneering and lasting pedagogical idea. This article aims to contribute to P4C's didactical-methodological foundation, to principles which can be said to underlie the multiple approaches to the idea without undermining any of them.

Quando definiu o conceito de Anormal, Michel Foucault revelou a consolidação de uma complexa e autofuncionante rede de instituições de controle, de mecanismos de distribuição e vigilância e de papéis e exigências sociais, lançando a criança nesse turbilhão. Este texto busca empreender uma análise genealógica da história do atendimento à criança pobre no Brasil, fundado na noção moral daquele conceito. A categoria “menor” foi construída segundo a díade justiça - assistência, que buscava amparo simultâneo de suas ações – regular, proteger e sanear moralmente a sociedade -, tendo como alvo à criança pobre, que não correspondia ao modelo de infância civilizada que a nação e a elite aspiravam. O atendimento institucional visava à defesa da sociedade, pelo afastamento das ditas crianças perigosas, cuja especificidade era o tratamento – disciplina e correção para anulação do perigo -, tornando-as aptas a reintegração produtiva na sociedade. Por isso, a instituição tinha como função modificar o caráter, ensinar um ofício, transformar a criança em “um cidadão útil a si e útil aos outros”, privilegiando sua educação. Os diferentes relatos e dados nos ajudam a desvelar que o conceito de anormalidade esteve diretamente relacionado ao de periculosidade, e que portanto, o “tratamento” dispensado às ditas crianças anormais, tinha como um dos objetivos - senão o principal - a cessação do “perigo social” que elas representavam para a sociedade. O que nos move hoje é o questionamento da própria ordem, até mesmo em sua dimensão legal: em que medida a liberdade deve ficar amarrada às atribuições normativas supostamente apoiadas numa natureza humana de que os saberes se arrogam o conhecimento? De que modo a liberdade pode deixar de ser mera derivação de qualificações morais e racionais das quais as pessoas podem ser dadas como carentes e excluídas? Estes novos problemas esta análise nos impôs.